What are attempts to solve a difficult problem of consciousness?

What do you think?

Leave a Reply

GIPHY App Key not set. Please check settings

4 Comments

  1. Consciousness – a category, steam room for matter. “The problem of consciousness” is about the attitude of these two, namely, about which of them is primary. Well, attempts or not attempts, but the actual solution is at least this and this: either consciousness is primary than matter, or the other way around. For those who solve this problem, it is not difficult – they decided it for themselves and their admirers. It is, apparently, for one of the two cannot choose one thing: either his insides depend on his outside, or, on the contrary, his insides – the causes of his outside of his,. If something happened from the outside-and I flare up, I get out, say, with enthusiasm. Or depression. Either everything is different: I’ll start and make something out of myself-and now my reality is obedient to me and sweet. Who in the end? Well, of course, it depends on me. I will do it – I will, I won’t do it – I won’t. It turns out I am for the primary consciousness. It turns out that I am for “be” from two Hamlet options. However, how did it become in me that consciousness won once? It was not otherwise that my matter was so, that is, lucky. This means that I am the third option: when the matter first makes consciousness, and then the consciousness itself sculpts matter to itself. Like childhood and adulthood, yes. You will be lucky if your consciousness begins to steer with your matter, and will not be lucky if you remain depending on the circumstances. The choice, therefore, is only for you if you have fed before you choose to grow.

  2. I won’t take up the exhaustive list, I will only note that I personally consider the solution to the Chalserta problem. The solution ultimately is illusionism: the presence of intangible mental states in a person is an illusion, error, more precisely – simplification and interpretation, in the process of the introduction. The standard objection is usually reduced To the fact that, they say, the illusion itself is a mental phenomenon that, they say, the illusion itself should be manifested by a “observer”, but let’s analyze the matter in more detail. It is surprising that Chalmers himself came close to such a decision, and the best description This solution was drawn up by him*. The key to solving a difficult problem is the paradox of phenomenal judgments. We give the word to Chalmers himself: “When I comment on the appearance of especially intense purple qualities I experienced, this is a behavioral act. Like all behavioral acts, these acts can, in principle, can be explained in terms of the internal causal organization of my cognitive system. You can tell a certain IP thorium about the activation of neurons, which will explain the implementation of these acts; And at a higher level, perhaps it would be possible to tell the story of cognitive representations and their high -level relations that perform appropriate explanatory work. <...> At the same time, we will never need to refer to the existence of conscious experience in physical or functional terms. <...> It seems that the conscious experience is irrelevant to explain the statements of phenomenal and phenomenal judgments, despite the fact that such statements and judgments directly relate to conscious experience! “How is this possible? Chalmers, then, leads in the most general form An explanation of phenomenal judgments. “Imagine that we have created computer intelligence <...>, who perceives our environment and is able to rationally think about the perceived. <...> Such a system, most likely, would have direct access to perceptual information like our cognitive system. <...> If we asked such a system as its perception was that she was assigned if such a system does not have enough detailed access to its low -level states, for example, it does not “know” about the code on which it is written, does not know about her memory structures, etc., then the answer could be like that ] “I know that there is a red three -wheeled bike, because I see it here.” And if we ask how she knows that she sees this bicycle, the answer is likely to be this: “I just see it, and that’s it.” “Chalmers refuses to consider such an explanation of phenomenal judgments in terms of functional and physical explanation of consciousness. And He is right: after all, we are only talking about verbal (or written) acts. So far, it is only a “theory of verbal report”, and not the theory of consciousness to ruin the indicated scheme in the explanation of consciousness, more precisely, the illusion of the existence of phenomenal consciousness, allows the theory of identity of consciousness and brain and related and related With it, the theory of the Armstrong Introspect. Assign the theory of identity, mental states are the physical states of the brain. What is called neuronal correlates of consciousness, from the point of view of the theory of identity, it is more correct to call neuronal equivalents of mental states. From nowhere we know that we have mental states? From the introspection (more precisely – retrospecification). One of the founders of the theory of identity, David Armstrong , in his wonderful book A Materialist Theory of Mind, put forward the theory that the introduction is the processing of information with the brain of its own states, that there is a Brain Self-Scanning System, arranged like propriocument. This allows us to go further than to explain verbal reports containing phenomenal Judges. If thoughts containing phenomenal judgments are brain states, signals in the brain, then it means that it is possible to have messages like “I see red color”, “I feel emotions”, “my feeling of red differs from the sensation of green”, etc. ., while this does not need some “phenomenal experience”: Brain Self-Scanning System, finding in the brain the presence of neuronal activity in the occipital cortex, will form a judgment “I see x”, and discovering the presence of activity in the limbic system , will form the judgment “I am experiencing emotion y”. And in the same way, “thoughts about thoughts”, etc. are possible to why the illusion of the intangible of these very mental states arises, is a simplification. Kolia is simple. The only thing I can say about how a feeling of damp differs from a feeling of pain is that they are simply different. Nash the brain does not process information about its own conditions in detail. Or, as David Dubrovsky writes: “In the phenomena of [subjective reality] I was given information in the“ pure ”form and the information about its media is entirely closed.” The neuro -scientific Michael Graziano is almost the same: Subjective Awareence is the Brain’s Simplified Model Of its Own Process of Attend. When Brain Self -Scanning System discovers a “mental state” emotion – i.e. Neuronal activity in the limbic system, the brain does not process, and does not have information about such details as the structure of the neural network, the physical characteristics of the potentials of the neurons, the spatial position of these neurons. All this is not just “hidden”, all this is completely ignored. Only one thing remains: there is an emotion. Something elementary. Something is very simple. The indivisible inexpressible element of subjective experience. Something, allegedly, is not located anywhere. Res cogitans, not resextensa. Something intangible … No less important is the discovery of Michael Gizanig of a left-western interpreter. The amazing fact lies in the fact that in our own brain, in its left hemisphere, there is a mechanism that creates plausible, but completely non -reality explanations to our own actions, words and thoughts! It is this mechanism that is responsible for such psychological protection as rationalization, it is this mechanism that creates the illusion of one’s own will and “I”, and it is in this mechanism that the explanations should be sought by all false hypotheses of “folk psychology” (firmly sown in scientific psychology and philosophy in philosophy Consciousness). so, now we are quite armed, in order to understand what allegedly intangible mental phenomena, phenomenal consciousness are supposedly. This is a simplified model in which the brain processes information about its own states. No more and no less. In reality, there is a human brain, and its conditions in which the most different information is “encoded” is a real mental. In the conclusion, I advise you to get acquainted with the activities of the Russian popularizer of science Daniel Laman, and here. I will not say that he has a strict theory from a philosophical point of view, but there are plenty of specifics that breaks the error of “folk psychology”. And thanks to him, for the fact that he often addresses the unsurpassed Gilbert Ryil)) ___*is not surprising. Despite the tendency to dualism, and, therefore, to mysticism, Chalmers, nevertheless, understands deeper than others, issues related to consciousness

  3. I won’t take up the exhaustive list, I will only note that I personally consider the solution to the Chalserta problem. The solution ultimately is illusionism: the presence of intangible mental states in a person is an illusion, error, more precisely – simplification and interpretation, in the process of the introduction. The standard objection is usually reduced To the fact that, they say, the illusion itself is a mental phenomenon that, they say, the illusion itself should be manifested by a “observer”, but let’s analyze the matter in more detail. It is surprising that Chalmers himself came close to such a decision, and the best description This solution was drawn up by him*. The key to solving a difficult problem is the paradox of phenomenal judgments. We give the word to Chalmers himself: “When I comment on the appearance of especially intense purple qualities I experienced, this is a behavioral act. Like all behavioral acts, these acts can, in principle, can be explained in terms of the internal causal organization of my cognitive system. You can tell a certain IP thorium about the activation of neurons, which will explain the implementation of these acts; And at a higher level, perhaps it would be possible to tell the story of cognitive representations and their high -level relations that perform appropriate explanatory work. <...> At the same time, we will never need to refer to the existence of conscious experience in physical or functional terms. <...> It seems that the conscious experience is irrelevant to explain the statements of phenomenal and phenomenal judgments, despite the fact that such statements and judgments directly relate to conscious experience! “How is this possible? Chalmers, then, leads in the most general form An explanation of phenomenal judgments. “Imagine that we have created computer intelligence <...>, who perceives our environment and is able to rationally think about the perceived. <...> Such a system, most likely, would have direct access to perceptual information like our cognitive system. <...> If we asked such a system as its perception was that she was assigned if such a system does not have enough detailed access to its low -level states, for example, it does not “know” about the code on which it is written, does not know about her memory structures, etc., then the answer could be like that ] “I know that there is a red three -wheeled bike, because I see it here.” And if we ask how she knows that she sees this bicycle, the answer is likely to be this: “I just see it, and that’s it.” “Chalmers refuses to consider such an explanation of phenomenal judgments in terms of functional and physical explanation of consciousness. And He is right: after all, we are only talking about verbal (or written) acts. So far, it is only a “theory of verbal report”, and not the theory of consciousness to ruin the indicated scheme in the explanation of consciousness, more precisely, the illusion of the existence of phenomenal consciousness, allows the theory of identity of consciousness and brain and related and related With it, the theory of the Armstrong Introspect. Assign the theory of identity, mental states are the physical states of the brain. What is called neuronal correlates of consciousness, from the point of view of the theory of identity, it is more correct to call neuronal equivalents of mental states. From nowhere we know that we have mental states? From the introspection (more precisely – retrospecification). One of the founders of the theory of identity, David Armstrong , in his wonderful book A Materialist Theory of Mind, put forward the theory that the introduction is the processing of information with the brain of its own states, that there is a Brain Self-Scanning System, arranged like propriocument. This allows us to go further than to explain verbal reports containing phenomenal Judges. If thoughts containing phenomenal judgments are brain states, signals in the brain, then it means that it is possible to have messages like “I see red color”, “I feel emotions”, “my feeling of red differs from the sensation of green”, etc. ., while this does not need some “phenomenal experience”: Brain Self-Scanning System, finding in the brain the presence of neuronal activity in the occipital cortex, will form a judgment “I see x”, and discovering the presence of activity in the limbic system , will form the judgment “I am experiencing emotion y”. And in the same way, “thoughts about thoughts”, etc. are possible to why the illusion of the intangible of these very mental states arises, is a simplification. Kolia is simple. The only thing I can say about how a feeling of damp differs from a feeling of pain is that they are simply different. Nash the brain does not process information about its own conditions in detail. Or, as David Dubrovsky writes: “In the phenomena of [subjective reality] I was given information in the“ pure ”form and the information about its media is entirely closed.” The neuro -scientific Michael Graziano is almost the same: Subjective Awareence is the Brain’s Simplified Model Of its Own Process of Attend. When Brain Self -Scanning System discovers a “mental state” emotion – i.e. Neuronal activity in the limbic system, the brain does not process, and does not have information about such details as the structure of the neural network, the physical characteristics of the potentials of the neurons, the spatial position of these neurons. All this is not just “hidden”, all this is completely ignored. Only one thing remains: there is an emotion. Something elementary. Something is very simple. The indivisible inexpressible element of subjective experience. Something, allegedly, is not located anywhere. Res cogitans, not resextensa. Something intangible … No less important is the discovery of Michael Gizanig of a left-western interpreter. The amazing fact lies in the fact that in our own brain, in its left hemisphere, there is a mechanism that creates plausible, but completely non -reality explanations to our own actions, words and thoughts! It is this mechanism that is responsible for such psychological protection as rationalization, it is this mechanism that creates the illusion of one’s own will and “I”, and it is in this mechanism that the explanations should be sought by all false hypotheses of “folk psychology” (firmly sown in scientific psychology and philosophy in philosophy Consciousness). so, now we are quite armed, in order to understand what allegedly intangible mental phenomena, phenomenal consciousness are supposedly. This is a simplified model in which the brain processes information about its own states. No more and no less. In reality, there is a human brain, and its conditions in which the most different information is “encoded” is a real mental. In the conclusion, I advise you to get acquainted with the activities of the Russian popularizer of science Daniel Laman, and here. I will not say that he has a strict theory from a philosophical point of view, but there are plenty of specifics that breaks the error of “folk psychology”. And thanks to him, for the fact that he often addresses the unsurpassed Gilbert Ryil)) ___*is not surprising. Despite the tendency to dualism, and, therefore, to mysticism, Chalmers, nevertheless, understands deeper than others, issues related to consciousness

  4. Nevertheless, for the sake of fairness, you probably have to violate)) .. and instead of an answer to your question to indicate that such a problem does not exist .. there is no problem of consciousness, but a phenomenon called “difficult problem of consciousness” of course historically has developed .. but Basically in Western culture, since there are not even its traces in original oriental cultures. Modern neurobiologists have already recognized this phenomenon insignificant almost in full .. There is no problem for them, there is only a problem of observing the brain structures with consciousness (resolution of tomographs). .. Neurobiology is not looking at the human brains in a microscope, but basically looking at the brains of chickens and mice, which are taught by a certain algorithm, and then the experimenters look at how this learning was reflected in the structures of the brain … So, having put millions of experiments, you can confidently indicate quite confidently Cases when consciousness (awareness and self -awareness) manifests itself, and when not .. in what conditions it is formed and In which one is not. This issue has already been resolved in fact .. Of course not in details, not exhaustive, but this is absolutely not a problem. There are many discussions of this and adjacent topics, but if you are interested in the issue of the emergence and increasing consciousness inside the subject, then to you to neurobiologists. A big mistake in the knowledge of consciousness is to think that it exists in ready -made form. Consciousness is formed and transformed throughout life, and its origins should be looked for in the intrauterine state (from about 5 months of pregnancy of the mother). In the West, the problem of consciousness grew out of selfishness and confrontation with materialists .. As a defending of a weaping theological position .. and later there was The hippies are pedalized against the background of drug use and damage to the empathic structures of the brain .. When the difference in the perception of different people required an explanation. “Did you see a dream about the pink elephant?”
    – No.
    – Look, cool! On the one hand, those who did not understand why the other person could not see someone else’s interesting dream .. And on the other hand, those who were mired in egocentrism and subjective vision appeared as a unique and indescribable experience. … But if they return. To cultures where consciousness has never been a problem, then .. Hinduism is completely built on the content of consciousness, and the embodiment itself in the human body is the essence of the provision of consciousness with active activity, through the provision of the body as an instrument. In the Chinese, consciousness has always been considered a function of the mind .. therefore A reasonable creature capable of practical activity and conclusions could either have consciousness or not to have it .. And then, in the presence of a conscious function, to develop it towards awareness, or towards self -awareness .. Well, if there is no basic consciousness, then the creature is simply reasonable in its daily activities, and is not capable of developing the perception of the world around them, nor develop perception with Eby as part of the universe. But of course, the issues of consciousness, awareness and self -awareness were raised .. But for a long time, and not quite serious. Then the teacher said:
    When I dreamed that I was a butterfly, I flew and did not realize that I was Zhuang Tzu, who sees a dream. That’s the problem. In the morning I woke up, and the first thing I thought was “I am not a butterfly at all, but Zhuang Tzu.” But now I am sitting in front of you and I can’t understand: I am Zhuang Tzu, who in a dream seemed to be a butterfly, or maybe I am a moth who is sleeping now and in a dream sees that he is Zhuang Tzu?
    3rd century BC The point is the features of culture, history, language, etc. An illustration (reference to Uyutub video) … that the European may seem significant or problematic, a representative of another culture can cause bewilderment … and therefore, a “difficult problem of consciousness” – This is a very cultural phenomenon, and is not a real subject of knowledge, but is very localized inside Westernic culture.

How wide is the border between good and evil, can the acts be neither good, but also not evil at the same time?